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**Case Study of European Union
Antipiracy Operation “Naval Force Somalia”: Successes,
Failures and Lessons Learned for the Hellenic Navy**

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September 2012

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**CASE STUDY OF EUROPEAN UNION ANTIPIRACY OPERATION “NAVAL
FORCE SOMALIA” SUCCESSES, FAILURES AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR
THE HELLENIC NAVY**

Evangelos Soufis, Lieutenant, Hellenic Navy

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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CASE STUDY OF EUROPEAN UNION ANTIPIRACY OPERATION “NAVAL FORCE SOMALIA” SUCCESSES, FAILURES AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE HELLENIC NAVY

ABSTRACT

The European Union is conducting a military operation to help deter acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. This military operation is named European Union Naval Force Somalia/Operation ATALANTA. Its mandate is to protect vessels of the World Food Program, humanitarian aid and African Union Military Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) shipping, protect vulnerable shipping, prevent acts of piracy, and monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.

The operation was scheduled for an initial period of twelve months but has now been extended by the EU council until December 2012. During this period, up to 12 EU ships and a number Maritime Patrol Aircraft will operate at any one time. The Hellenic Navy was the first to be tasked with the tactical command of the operation.

The purpose of this project is to investigate the rules and procedures of the European Union concerning the deployment and the contribution of its members in military operations, and more specifically in the first EU naval antipiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, it analyzes the first four months of deployment and indentifies the lessons learned that could be applied in future EU operations and Hellenic Navy contingency operations.

This thesis is a narrative analysis of the experience and the thoughts of the writer and in no way expresses official position of the Hellenic Navy or any other official body.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOO	Area of Operation
CEUMC	Chairman of the EUMC
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CONOPS	Concept of Operation
DFID	Department for International Development
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FCdr	Force Commander
FHQSA	Forward Headquarters Support Area
FLC	Force Logistic Coordinator
HNS	Host Nation Support
HOA	Horn of Africa
IMD	Initiating Military Directive
MNDDP	Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPRA	Spanish Marine Patrol Air Force
MPRA	Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft
MSO	Military Strategic Option
MSPA	Maritime Security Patrol Area
NBC	National Born Cost
NVCG	National Volunteer Coast Guard

OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHQ	Operational Headquarter
OpCdr	Operation Commander
OPDEF	Operational Defect
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSD	Operational Stand Down
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PVSTs	Port Visits
RAS	Replenishment at Sea
RLS	Real Life Support
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RSOM&I	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOR	Statement of Requirements
TCN	Troop Contributing Nations
TOA	Transfer of Authority
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolutions
WFP	World Food Program

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this project is to investigate the rules and procedures of the European Union (EU) concerning the deployment and the contribution of its members in military operations, and more specifically in the first EU naval antipiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, it seeks to provide an analysis of the first four months of deployment and identify the lessons learned that could be applied in future EU operations and Hellenic Navy contingency operations.

This analysis will help the reader to understand that taking part in a contingency operation is always a new task even though you have done it many times in the past. Each operation is different from the others for thousand reasons but all have a common lesson: the preparation time is never enough. Moreover, the lack of experience in contingency operation, especially for military personnel that have never done operations outside of their country, without being familiar with the climate of the area, and working under new regulations and procedures may require more effort to succeed. The goal in this kind of operation requires healthy participants due to long deployments for long periods, and secondly to deliver support on time and accurately.

For this EU deployment to the Gulf of Aden the concept of operations was new, as it was the first EU operation of its kind. We were required to work within a framework and environment of regulations and orders that had have never utilized before, operate in a foreign country with totally different way of life, and engage with persons from different countries without common experience and a different way of thinking.

Greece is one of the smallest countries in the European Union (the economy of Greece is about 2.5% of the euro zone according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) close to financial collapse, when this thesis was written (2011). But Greece is also one of the greatest maritime powers in the world and a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade

Organization. Since the Operation ATALANTA was planned and launched, on December 8, 2008, Greece has participated with tactical command of the operation and one frigate (HNDGS, 2009).

This analysis focuses on the first four months of the deployment. Specifically, it identifies the main difficulties that should have been resolved in order to avoid any delays or problems, as the main logistics hub established in Djibouti was the prime support of all the European Union forces acting in the area of the Gulf of Aden.

B. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY

Chapter I describes the organization and methodology deployed in this study and the purpose of this project. Chapter II introduces an overview or “big picture” of the and its objectives that were more obvious and familiar only after two months of deployment in the logistic hub in Djibouti. Background of the piracy problem in the strategic Gulf of Aden area is presented in order to present the facts that drove the EU Council to take the decision to start this operation.

Chapter III highlights the EU procedures, and EU council delegations that are the base of all EU military operations as far as planning, execution, contingency contracting and cost allocation are concerned between the EU member states. This chapter focuses mostly to the EU command and control structure that we should be aware before our deployment in EU operation. This is necessary because, exactly this lack of experience in EU structure and procedure was trigger to operational stresses and potential safety problems. After chapter III the reader will have a picture of how EU council decisions influence and facilitate the recourses and people available in area of operation (AOO). This seems to be a rather over-simplification a long and complex process.

Chapter IV is relatively straightforward as it stemmed from the author’s experience the first four months of deployment in Djibouti and the beginning of the operation. The problem identified is that despite EU operation’s requirements and member governments’ initiatives to support the development of the operation reducing piracy incidents by nearly 80%, there remained difficulties and frustrations related to contingency logistics that could have been avoided. Chapter IV considers the support

plan of the operation and identifies those problems that should have been avoided. Chapter V presents the recommendations and lessons learned. This research was based primarily on documentation through the European Union Delegations, doctrines and plans, previous published theses on contingency operations, personal reports and other publicly available data. Through the analysis, for this study, of collected documentation, supplemented by the author's first-hand personal experience, of the first four months of the operation, conclusions and recommendations are made that may improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the logistic support of the EU and Hellenic Navy contingency operations.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary research question of this study is: how can Hellenic Navy contingency contracting and logistics procedures become more efficient and effective, based on the lessons learned by the deployment in the first European Union naval operation? From the study of this question the following secondary questions arose:

- What is the background of the operation?
- Why is the European Union conducting this operation?
- What is the European Union military structure?
- How do EU member states contribute to the operation's cost?
- What are the main problems in implementing the EU Council delegation?
- What else can be done, in order to manage contingency contracting more efficiently and effectively?

D. SUMMARY

This project discusses the need of the EU/Hellenic Navy to implement and improve contingency contracting procedures. There is existing research addressing contingency planning to optimize cost and efficiency. So far, there has been no

application of these methods in a Greek environment for military operations. Since the Hellenic Armed Forces are part of the European Armed Forces, they bear a significant portion of the responsibility for conducting these operations.

II. BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Chapter II is to present a broad strategic overview of the area of operation, the Gulf of Aden. It is common place that when participating in a military operation one may never have all the relevant information necessary to begin efficiently and effectively but rather, you “learn the ropes” during and subsequent to the.

B. HORN OF AFRICA

The Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa are the two places that before the participation in this operation were known only as the canal and the ashore between Africa and Yemen and nothing more. Only two days before the official start date of the operation Atalanta and the arrival in Djibouti I had a clear view of what, where and why the Gulf of Aden is one of the most important trade canals in the world. And this information was from an informal “web search” and not from an official source of the operation.

The Gulf of Aden is placed between Somalia and Yemen and it is a close to 2,500 square miles area (400nm long and 150nm width). It connects by sea Europe with Asia, Africa and the Middle East. It is one of the most important merchandise routes in the world: the Suez Canal followed from the Red sea which ends at the most narrow point between Djibouti port and Yemen ends up in the Gulf of Aden. The only alternative commercial route by sea is around South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope which is thousands of miles longer (3500 miles) and much more time consuming and expensive. Even though the cost to pass through the Suez Canal is high, as are the danger of pirate attacks, this area remains a popular route. About 1,500 ships, which are the 10% of the global shipping traffic and the 4% of the world’s daily crude oil supply, pass through the Gulf of Aden every month. (Shay, 2010).

The Horn of Africa (HOA) is the peninsula of Northern Africa and lies along the southern side of the Gulf of Aden. It is the most eastern projection of Africa and contains the countries of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia.



Figure 1. Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden (From: Stock, 2004)

The main threat on the international trade route, which starts from the Suez Canal through to the Gulf of Aden, is piracy or terror attacks from Somali pirates. As we can see from the Figure (1) the horn of Africa is settled in a strategic area connecting Africa and Middle East and it is the gateway to the oilfields of the Persian Gulf (Asefa, 2003).

Nevertheless, Somalia has become one of the most unstable places in the world since the collapse of the dictatorial regime in 1991. The recent history of Somalia is very complex since it is a country with no effective central government at least for the last decade. Somalia consists of three distinct regions and a multi-clan indigenous population that leave at least half of them under the worst humanitarian conditions. One can easily understand that living under these conditions is difficult to survive, and when you have nothing else to lose but your miserable life, it is very easy to become a pirate even for the daily bread and water of your family (Asefa, 2003).

According to the UN (2010), piracy off the coast of Somalia is mainly caused by illegal fishing activity in Somali waters by foreign ships. These ships are using technologies and practices on fishing, which have severely destroyed the ability of local fishermen with small wooden boats to earn their food. Also the absence of a central government and an effective national coast guard forced many of the old fishermen to become pirates in order to earn their livings (UN, 2010).

The UK's Department of International Development (DFID) in 2005 report that Somalia lost about 100 million US dollars due to illegal tuna and shrimp fishing in Somalia waters by foreign trawlers (Dange, 2009).

This situation—poverty, starvation and turbulence between the indigenous clans—has resulted in Somalia becoming one of the worst piracy hot spots in the world while maintaining its importance as a trade route between Europe, Asia, Africa and Middle East. Piracy off the Somali coast according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) from 2000 was a threat for international shipping. Since 2005 IMO and World Food Program (WFP) organization expressed their concern over the rise of piracy since piracy has obstructed the delivery of food aid shipments. 90% of the WFP's assistance arrive by sea and due to this is very vulnerable (low speed, deck closed to sea surface) to piracy attacks and require a military escort (Shay, 2010).

The IMO (2010) estimates that piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden are caused from not more than six major groups, about 1,200 Somali pirates using longer “mother ships” full of fuels in order to reach further from the coast in the ocean. There the smaller boats troll around until they find a vulnerable commercial ship, and board by using hooks and ladders¹ (IMO, 2010).

Many international organizations like the United Nations (UN) are concerned over the rise of piracy due to the increase in shipping costs and insurance rates. Giplin (2009) stated, “Piracy imposes costs on the global economy. According to international shipping organizations, insurance rates for ships have raised to \$20,000 per voyage in

¹ “Somali pirates intensified attacks away from their own coast and were responsible for 44% of the 289 piracy incidents on the world's seas in the first nine months of 2010”, according to a report published On 18 Oct 2010 by the International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau (IMB, 2009).

2009 because of piracy, from an estimated \$500 in 2008—a forty-fold increase” (Giplin, 2009). Also, avoidance (namely, the alternate route around the Cape of Good Hope) adds roughly 3,500 miles to the journey. The cost of this diversion is particularly worrisome during spikes in oil prices. Deterring pirates is also costly. For example, long-range acoustical devices cost \$20,000–\$30,000 each. Permanent onboard security guards may be prohibitively expensive. It costs an estimated \$1.3 million to deploy a frigate for a month, and approximately \$200–350 million to sustain naval vessels in the Gulf of Aden annually” (Giplin, 2009).

C. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE GULF OF ADEN- EU NAVAL FORCE SOMALIA

According to Hellenic Navy General Staff (2009) at the beginning of 2008 there were 122 pirate attacks and 32 vessels seized. (HNDGS, 2009) Each year approximately 33,000 commercial ships traverse the Gulf of Aden, making it the busiest shipping pass in the world (Giplin, 2009). The military presence in this area has increased daily since 2008 due to the problems with piracy. Figure 2 shows the Military Forces and the Area of Operation (AOO) for the EU deployment to the Gulf of Aden.

The first military force was the Combined Task Force 150, a multinational coalition that in August 2008 adopt the role of fighting Somali piracy by establishing a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) within the Gulf of Aden. The main task of the CTF 150 was to assist in the “war against terror” so piracy is lower on its list of priorities. Therefore, the United States in August 2008 established a protected shipping corridor in the Gulf of Aden that is protected by another task force, CTF 151. But the increasing threat posed by piracy also caused concerns in India since most of its shipping trade routes pass through the Gulf of Aden. In October 2008, Russia joined international anti-piracy efforts in the area with warships operating on a rotation basis (USAFRICACOM, 2008).

The same concerns contributed to the drop of piracy attacks, along with all the other Navy Forces presented in the area. So until the end of 2008, India, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and EU, with the exception of France (with its naval forces known as

ALINDIEN² and its permanent presence in Djibouti), sent warships and commando units to protect and to rescue their ships from Somali pirates in December 2008. Officially the beginning of the EU antipiracy operation ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden dates from the 13th December of 2008.

Solving the problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden calls for more than the presence of a few dozen ships. The complexity of the problem exceeds the capacity of most individual nations and therefore must be addressed with a multinational operation under the EU umbrella which itself introduces its own complexities and difficulties given this is the first operation of its kind. Nations also need the proper legal basis and authority to do it. For example, if Greece or England decided to support their interests in the Gulf of Aden it was relatively easy, as they only needed their government's decision. Also NATO operations are much more rapidly launched due to their experience and the legal background, which is known since World War II. So it is necessary to explain to the reader the process and the legal basis of EU decisions for military actions.

² **ALINDIEN** is a French naval acronym designating the admiral in charge of the maritime zone of the Indian Ocean, and of the French forces there. The office has been held by Contre-amiral Jacques Launay since 31 December 2006. Contre-amiral is equivalent to the Commonwealth navy rank of Commodore. (ALINDIEN, 2010)




Figure 2. Military Forces in the Gulf of Aden. This map presents the Area of Operation (AOO), the Spanish Marine Patrol Air force (MPRA), The World Food Program (WFP) in the port of Mogadishu in Somalia, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Force (KSA), French forces in Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN) and the two NATO forces CTF 150 and CTF 151 (From: Part of presentation about operation ATALANTA, Northwood Headquarters 2008)

D. CONCLUSION

Chapter II has described the strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden and also an overview of the “big picture” of the AOO and piracy problems at this area.

The operation, which was scheduled for an initial period of twelve months, has been extended by the EU council until December 2012. A European naval force, numbering up to 3,000 men and women, 14 warships and 2 aircrafts has managed to

reduce the acts of piracy by 95%. The vessels of the World Food Program have safely sailed across the seas of the Horn of Africa and delivered 130,000 tons of food to the population of Somalia³ (IMB, 2010).

Chapter III highlights the European Union procedures, council delegations and exposed the reader to the base of EU operation such as planning and execution.

IMB Live Piracy Map 2009

This map shows all the piracy and armed robbery incidents reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre during 2009. If exact coordinates are not provided, estimated positions are shown based on information provided. Zoom-in and click on the pointers to view more information of an individual attack. Pointers may be superimposed on each other.

📍 = Actual Attack 📍 = Attempted Attack 📍 = Suspicious vessel




Figure 3. This map shows all the piracy and armed robbery incidents reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre during 2009. (From: IMB Piracy & Armed Robbery Map, 2009).

³ According to the London-based International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the number of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden decreased in the first half of 2010 by 34% year-on-year mostly due to the ongoing anti-piracy operation off the Somali coast. (IMB, 2010)

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III. THE FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL OPERATION IN SOMALIA

A. INTRODUCTION

European Union Naval Force Somalia/Operation ATALANTA was launched in 2008 and its mandate was: to protect vessels of the World Food Program, contribute to humanitarian aid and the African Union Military Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) shipping, protect vulnerable shipping, and monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. (EUCOUNCIL, Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on European Union military Operation, 2008)

The European Union web-site declares that because of

The EU ATALANTA operation, WFP delivered more than 385,992 metric tons of food into Somalia through Mogadishu, Merka and Bossaso, and Berbera ports. WFP remains extremely grateful to the EU for committing itself to escorting ships carrying WFP food for 2009, giving them the long-term protection that their shipments need, especially in view of the increasing threat. (EU NAVFORCE, 2010)

Chapter III provides the structure of the first European Union Naval Operation ATALANTA. Before taking part in this operation I believed it wasn't necessary to be familiar with the EU bodies, military structure and procedures of military contact. But the entire process at both political and military strategic levels has to be seen both as a whole but separately also.

There were different definitions of success for the participating units of the operation. The strong political content of the operation was obvious from the beginning as too many different forces and countries participate in the same area with the same task but with different priorities and different definitions of success. EU Military planning and action will be defined to include the structure of the planning process and the roles of EU Bodies during an emergency crisis. It is important for the reader to understand how the EU conduct a military action because this procedure is complicated and includes multinational forces which was one of the main reasons that delayed the establishment of the Support area in Djibouti since it takes time to work according these procedures.

B. OPERATION ATALANTA PARTICIPANTS AND LEADERSHIP

The operation was scheduled for an initial period of twelve months beginning on December 13, 2008, but now has been extended by the EU council until December 2013. During this period, up to 30 EU ships and a number of Maritime Patrol Aircraft participate and operate at any one time.

The military forces of European Union countries participating in such missions maintain forces in the region of interest only as long as there is a crisis. Their participation is not mandatory. The EU member states voluntarily decide whether, when and how to participate. Although the responsibility for the deployment rests with each of the participating member state, the planning for force deployment requires early co-ordination and preparation, which is fall under the auspices of OP. commander (EU Council , EU Concept for Force Deployment, 2008).

Initially, only eight EU member states decided to make a permanent operational contribution to the operation: Italy, Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece. Additionally, a number of Cypriot, Irish, Finnish, Maltese and Swedish military personnel supplemented the team at the Northwood Operation Headquarters. The European naval force operates in a zone comprising the south of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and part of the Indian Ocean to include the Seychelles, which represents an area comparable to that of the Mediterranean. Also a considerable international naval presence in this zone provides permanent backup to the European naval force. The EU NAVFOR operation is in permanent liaison with these other forces, which include CTF-151, NATO Maritime Group, Russian, Indian, Japanese and Chinese vessels.

This initiative, which was welcomed by the whole community of ship-owners and merchant navies, makes it possible for vessels that observe EU NAVFOR recommendations to know what arrangements are in place and, in some cases, receive close military protection, thus reducing the risk of attacks or capture. (MSCHOA, 2009)

Greece is one of the member states that contributed to the operation from the beginning and which, during the period December 13, 2008 to the end of April 2009, had

the command of the operation from the frigate “Psara.” Greece has continued contributing with at least one frigate to this antipiracy operation, even during its financial difficulties of 2010 and 2011.

The EU member states accepted the UK proposal to lead this operation because the United Kingdom had the appropriate maritime capability, experience and resources to undertake this responsibility and were pleased to be appointed as the task commander. Also Northwood is one of the five national OHQ available for EU military operations (with the others placed in France, Germany, Italy and Greece).

Over 20 ships and aircraft were deployed throughout the operation. Approximately 1,200 people took part in the operation during the first year of deployment. At the very beginning of the operation, the forces that were in the area when the operational commander arrived were four frigates from France, Germany, England and Greece (with the force commander onboard). Usually ships had to cover 1200 nm but there were a few units to cover a huge area (2 million sq. km. miles) of ocean (ATALANTA, 2010). Greece, being one of the greatest maritime powers in the world, wanted to be part of the European Humanitarian Operation launched in support of Resolutions of the UN Security Council that would ensure maritime security (HNDGS, 2009).

When the ATALANTA operation commenced, on December 12, 2008, Greece began its participation with the frigate “Psara” and contributed personnel to the Operational HQs in Northwood and to the naval base in Djibouti. In April 2009, the frigate “Nikiforos Fokas” relieved the “Psara,” and was in turn relieved in August 2009 by the frigate “Adrias.” Additionally, the helicopter on board of each frigate participated in the operation. Greece, in order to assist the EU in the dealing with the acts of piracy along the Somali coast, approved the participation of the Hellenic Navy and the assumption of operational tactical command by a Hellenic senior officer. The first Tactical Commander for the initial four-month period of the operation was Commodore Antonios Papaioannou, who took command on board the frigate “Psara.” On April 6, 2009, a Spanish Navy captain, on board a Spanish frigate, succeeded Commodore

Papaioannou. That was also the end of the preparatory phase of the establishment of the forces. At this point support of the Operation had contributed to meeting a standard of performance that is outlined in EU regulations.

FORCE ASSET AVAILABILITY - 2009

Nation	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
GR						FRIGATE PSARA							
SE					2 PATROL BOATS/CORVETS + SUPPORT SHIP								
UK		FRIGATE HMS NORTHUMBERLAND											
GE					FRIGATE FGS RHEINLAND PFALZ								
FR					FRIGATE FLOREAL								
ES		FRIGATE VICTORIA& RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT											

Figure 4. Force asset availability for 2008–2009

According to the Hellenic Navy the cost of contributing to operation ATALANTA for one year was estimated close to 24.500.000 Euros and including the cost of the frigate (22.700.000 Euros), the cost of the Hello (980.000Euros) and the cost of the FHQ staff (820.000Euros).

The cost of the mission was one of the main issues since it was not clear from the beginning what costs had been allocated and where they had been allocated. Also, most of the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) already had contracts (usually with NAMSA or Inchcape) to support their military ships, a situation that cause trouble to the EU contracts since they were signed and never used at least the first four months.

Nations wishing to use the ship support and replenishment contract (excluding fuel) would need to pre-finance with €155,000. This was based on an average cost of replenishing a frigate, with associated port support, over a two-month period. The administrative management of ship support services and replenishment was managed

under the National Born Cost (NBC) process, where member states participate voluntarily. To date, no member state or third state participating in the operation has formally notified its intention to participate in this system.

But, according to the EU council, TCNs have a collective responsibility for logistic support of EU NAVFOR elements. The provision of support is mostly arranged from national resource, and ad hoc contracts (EUCOUNCIL, EU CONCEPT 11716/08 FOR CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION 2008). That was the main reason that the participating EU member states didn't offer "high value" units like tankers.

The concept of logistic support to the EU NAVFOR elements, both ashore and afloat, was for participating TCN units to arrive within the AOO ready in all respects to undertake EU NAVFOR tasking. Refueling for units escorting WFP was achieved through replenishment at sea from the other-states support (USA), or during planned port visits, or during operational stand-down periods by using Djibouti as the primary hub for EU NAVFOR resupply and Mombasa as a secondary option. The primary method of resupply of provisions was the use of a primary coordinating shipping agent. Units liaised directly with the agent for supplies and other supporting services and were supported by the multinational FHQSA in Djibouti or by a surge capability in Mombasa. Strategic resupply and operational defect stores demands were arranged on a national basis and coordinated in theatre by the FHQSA.

Also, there were a number of different scenarios for ship fuel. The first scenario was that, when a ship refueled alongside and utilized the EU contract for fuel, the member state would be invoiced for the actual cost of the refueling. It was anticipated that the EU contract would allow for payment 90 days after the invoice date, and there would be no requirement for member states to pre-finance. That means that the EU financial mechanism would pay the supplier and seek reimbursement from the member state.

When a member state provided a tanker, it was anticipated that the tanker would arrive in the Area Of Operation (AOO) with a full, or near full, load. The member state providing the tanker would provide ATALANTA with the price paid for the fuel before

arriving in theatre, and member state ships refueling from the tanker would pay that price. Member states were invoiced by ATHENA and the member state providing the tankers were reimbursed based on approved invoice.

If the tanker would need to replenish its stock and used a national arrangement, the cost would be the responsibility of the member state providing the tanker. The price charged to ships would be adjusted if necessary and the member state reimbursed at the same rate. Any fuel stocks remaining in the tanker when it departed the AOO would be the property of the member state that provided the tanker.

Alternatively, if the tanker wished to use the EU contract, then the invoice will be paid by EU (through ATHENA mechanism) and immediately charged to the member state providing the tanker. Ships taking fuel would be charged at the contract price and the member state's invoice reduced at the same rate. Any fuel stocks remaining in the tanker when it departs the AOO will be the property of the member state that provided the tanker. As a result ATALANTA was acting without tanker support the first four months.

Another issue was the priorities of the contributing nations. EU priorities were the protection of humanitarian aid ships and generally the ships with EU member flags, but national priorities were to escort the ships of commercial firms whose operations served a particular national interest. The United Kingdom tended to be pleased with the idea of military intervention but France was more skeptical due to their specific national interests in the area, and Germany was reluctant since they had established their own support team and frigate in Djibouti since 2002. The result was that all of the participating countries tended to move in different directions. Only later were they organized to work together to suppress the war against piracy.

After only four months the operation was seen as a success as a result of acts of piracy being dramatically reduced. Also, thanks to operation ATALANTA, the Hellenic Navy proved its operational capability and readiness to carry out the mission, no matter how difficult or complex it was.



Figure 5. The "Karlsruhe" is in the Gulf of Aden to defend commercial vessels from pirates as part of the EU-led Operation ATALANTA (From: EUNAVFOR, 2010)

C. GERMAN AND SPANISH PARTICIPATION

A German forward operating base has been operating in Djibouti since 2002. It consists of just over 20 persons including a doctor, military police, interpreter, and three logistic personnel. There have been several meetings with the commanding officer and his logistics officer, who offered useful information about Djibouti and some of the best practices. He also offered the use of some of his expertise and his facilities, but before allowing this he needed permission from Berlin. For example, if any of the FHQSA vehicles were involved in an accident the German military police representative was able to assist with the local police (this is just one example of how they could be useful). German personnel were living in the Sheraton Hotel in Djibouti and stated there were no problems with either force protection or hygiene.

Every month they brought everything they needed (money, food supplies, personnel, mail, medicines, etc.) from Germany with a direct flight from Berlin. When a German ship arrived in Djibouti, the German team had the responsibility to transfer all the commodities that had arrived on the direct military flights from the air base to the

port. They had no bank account for money transfer and they did not use the local ship agents. The forklift, pallettrons and large freight vehicles were the only support they used from the local market.

The Spanish team in Djibouti worked in the same way as the Germans. They were in the area from 2004 with three MP3 ORION planes to protect the Spanish ships that fish in the area. Spanish Maritime Patrol Air Force (MPRA) in Djibouti consisted of four crews totaling nearly 60 persons, but even they were part of the operation, they kept their own contracts and every two weeks brought an aircraft full of supplies directly from Madrid. Both teams were capable and familiar with the environment and each of them had their own agreements with the local authorities.

D. FORCE STRUCTURE

The Council of EU decided in 2001 to establish the Political and Security Committee (PSC)⁴, the EU Military Committee (EUMC)⁵ and the EU Military Staff

⁴ **PSC** (*Political and Security Committee*): “The Political and Security Committee is the Council body that deals with crisis situations and examines all the options that might be considered as the Union’s response within the institutional framework and without prejudice to the decision-making and implementation procedures of each pillar. It should have access to all necessary information processed through agreed channels (including from NATO, UN, OSCE)”. (Council E. , Council Decision of 22 January 2001/78/CFSP setting up the Political and Security Committee (PSC), 2001)

⁵ **The EUMC** (European Union Military Committee) is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations. It exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework. In crisis management situations, and upon the PSC’s request, the EUMC draws up, prioritize and present the main military strategic options. The EUMC evaluates the military strategic options developed by the EUMS and forwards them to the PSC together with its own evaluation and military advice. On the basis of the military strategic option selected by the Council, it authorizes an Initiating Military Directive drafted by the EUMS for the OpCdr. Based upon the EUMS evaluation, the EUMC provides advice and recommendation to the PSC on:

- a. CONOPS and the SOR developed by the OpCdr
- b. Draft OPLAN, including an annex on Use of Force and Rules of Engagement drawn up by the OpCdr
- c. Termination option for the operation. (Council E. , 2001)

(EUMS)⁶. These are the EU Bodies that involved in Strategic Planning during an emerging crisis. The military planning is taking part in four levels: the Political and Strategic level, the military strategic level, the operational level and the tactical level (Council E. , Council Decision of 22 January 2001/78/CFSP setting up the Political and Security Committee (PSC), 2001). The main task of EUMS (European Union Military Staff) is to prepare the two basic plans: advance military strategic planning and crisis response military strategic planning⁷.

As clearly defined in EU Council Decision 2001/78/CFSD one of the main tasks of the PSC is “crisis response”: the PSC proposes to the Council the political objectives to be pursued by the Union and recommends the options aimed at contributing to the settlement of the crisis. Furthermore, the PSC gives political guidance to the EUMC as appropriate and approves the Initiating Military Directive. The PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of the EU's military response to the crisis” (EU Council, 2001).

Crisis Management Operations (CMOs) that could be launched by the EU are within the EU tasks, which include "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks

⁶ The EUMS (European Union Military Staff) According to Council Decision of 22 January 2001 on the establishment of the European Union Military Staff (2001/80/CFSP): “The mission of the EUMS is to perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks⁶ including identification of European national and multinational forces and to implement policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC. It supports the EUMC regarding situation assessment and military aspects of strategic planning, over the full range of Petersberg tasks, for all cases of EU-led operations, whether or not the EU draws on NATO assets and capabilities. The EUMS develops and prioritizes military strategic options as the basis for the military advice of the EUMC to the PSC. It supports EUMC in elaborating the IMD.” (EU Council, 2001)

⁷ **Advance Military Strategic Planning:** is conducted in order to prepare the EU to deal with future crises. Normally, this planning is separated into two categories:

“Generic planning is the production of basic plans developed for possible operations where some planning factors have not yet been fully identified or cannot be assumed. It identifies at this stage the general capabilities required” (European Union, 2008).

“Contingency plans are developed for possible operations where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. These plans are produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning” (European Union, 2008).

Crisis Response Military Strategic Planning: is conducted in response to an existing emerging crisis. This process will lead to the selection by the Council of a Military Strategic Option, and the nomination of an Operational Commander. (Council E. , EU Concept for Civil-Military Co-operation(CIMIC) for EU-led, 2009)

and tasks assigned to combat forces in the context of crisis management, including peacemaking.” To meet the full range of tasks with the necessary flexibility, there will be a significant role, among others, for adequate military logistics and civilian capabilities and resources (EUCOUNCIL, EU CONCEPT 11716/08 FOR CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC), 2008).

The European Union's first naval operation is being conducted within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)⁸.

With the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, the European Political Cooperation was established as the CFSP and the European Union was created in the format that basically works today. The European Union is founded on three pillars. The first is the pillar of the European Communities and European Commission (the main development of this pillar was the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which was completed on January 1, 2002 with the launch of the Euro (€). The second pillar is the CFSP (formerly APS), which does cooperation in foreign and defense policy. The third pillar is the cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs (e.g. asylum and immigration policy).

⁸ The European Treaty also provides the Union with a common security policy that covers all matters relating to its security, including the gradual formulation of a common defense policy. ESDP forms part of the CFSP. The Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999 placed crisis management tasks at the core of the process of strengthening the European common security and defense policy. These are known as the Petersberg tasks. They are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking. (Council, 2001)




Figure 6. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) constitute the operational arm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), for both military and civilian purposes. ESDP belongs to Pillar 2 of the European Union. (After: Three pillars of the European Union , 1991)

In Operation ATALANTA the Military-Strategic level is the operation headquarters (OHQ) in London. Below the Military-Strategic level (OHQ) is the Operational Level, which is FHQ, and the tactical level, which includes the forces that act in the area of operation, the ships, the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) and the Forward headquarter Support Area in Djibouti (FHQSA). The following diagram shows the structure of Operation ATALANTA.

The Political and Security Committee (PSC), under the authority of the European Council, exercises the political control and strategic direction of Operation ATALANTA. The OpCdr is directly responsible to the PSC for ATALANTA's planning and conduct. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC), supported by the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), monitors its execution and the Chairman of the EUMC (CEUMC) act as the OpCdr's primary point of contact (EUCOUNCIL, Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on European Union military Operation, 2008).




Figure 7. EUNAVFOR STRUCTURE.

At this point it is important to mention that the Operational Commander is responsible for the military operational planning and the production of the concept of the operation (CONOPS), the production of the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and the Rules of Engagement (ROE). So it is clear which are the EU military bodies and structure and who is conducted with the military planning and execution.

The member states will retain operational command (OPCOM) of military units are placed on the EU NAVFOR. The Operational Commander shall exercise operational control to them in the Joint Operation Area and will be assigned to the Force Commander of the Tactical Command of all surface units within the Area of Operation. That was a reason of conflicting perceptions and interests during the operation.



Figure 8. EUNAVFOR Area of Operation (AOO) and The Joint area Of Operation (JOA) (From: HNDGS, 2009)

The Area of Operation (AOO) extends to 700 nm from the coast of Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Eritrea, Yemen and the southern coast of Oman, with a limit in the Indian Ocean in Meridian latitude of 060 ° East and the Red Sea boundary line connecting the maritime border between Eritrea-Sudan and Yemen-Saudi Arabia. Apart from the AOO, has defined and the Joint Operations Area (JOA), including military bases and means of friendly countries which may assist the force in case it is necessary.



Figure 9. (L-R) Corvettes HMS Stockholm and HMS Malmo and support vessel HMS Trosso are seen off the Karlskrona naval base in southern Sweden, March 21, 2009. The two Stockholm class corvettes HMS Stockholm and HMS Malmo, accompanied by HMS Trosso, took part in the anti-piracy EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation ATALANTA) off the Somali coast starting May 15, 2009 (From: ATALANTA, 2010)

E. CONCLUSION

Chapter III makes clear how the EU was able to plan and conduct the first naval operation that was highly challenging from a military perspective and ensuring a continuous political oversight. It also illustrates how the difficulty of defining strong common European interests poses a structural and participating weakness in EU operations. This is a fundamental consequence of the diverging political priorities of the member states, as they will never let the operational command of the participating military units.

IV. RECONNAISSANCE AND PREPARATION PHASE OF ATALANTA THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF DEPLOYMENT IN DJIBOUTI

A. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this section is to describe the preparatory phase, which according to the ATHENA mechanism operating manual is the first phase of the planning process for building up an EU operation and starts when a Crisis Management Concept has been approved by the council of the European Union and ends when the Operation Commander is appointed to the area of operation (EUCOUNCIL, COUNCIL DECISION 2008/975/CFSP, 2008).

The primary task during this operational phase is to identify the set of capabilities, assets and forces required to undertake the military task, which derived from the mission objectives. In a few words, the first team that arrives in the AOO had to provide the main supplies and services that operation would require in order functioning. Real life Support goods and services, transportation and vehicles, flow of funds, availability of medical facilities, fuels, are some early priorities and lack of any of these would degrade the effectiveness of the operation.

During this phase, the first team that arrived in the area of operation should be well trained and versatile enough to conduct its mission. This period is usually the first forty-five days of the operation but in operation ATALANTA was much longer since the main tasks were accomplished during the first four months.

“The planning process of building up an EU-led force from EU member states' forces, assets and capabilities can be grouped in three phases:

- Identification phase: to identify a set of capabilities/forces required to undertake the military tasks derived from the mission
- Force Activation phase: to activate a force with all the capabilities required to match the military tasks derived from the mission

- Deployment phase: to assemble and deploy committed forces with transfer of authority (TOA) completed to the Operation Commander.” (EUCOUNCIL, EU Concept for Force Deployment, 2008)

The identification, activation and deployment of forces are distinct but interlinked activities within the overall operational planning process before the development of the concept of operation (CONOPS) through the deployment of the EU-led force and its sustainment. The entire process at both political and military strategic levels has to be seen as a whole but separately also (EUCOUNCIL, EU Concept for Force Deployment, 2008).

In operation ATALANTA one of the main problematic issues was that there were not distinctions between the identification and activation phase. Also, before the identification phase finished, operational authority was transferred to the Operational Commander but not the authority of spending funds and this delayed two months since the EU Council delayed on the agreement of the budget of operation ATALANTA.

EU force identification, activation and deployment must be tailored to satisfy the specific requirements pertaining to all kinds of possible EU-led crisis management operations. This implies potentially different requirements in terms of response and readiness, and force size. As for the development of the CONOPS and the Operation Plan (OPLAN), Force Activation is ultimately a core responsibility of the Operation Commander (EUCOUNCIL, EU Concept for Force Deployment, 2008).

Although the responsibility for deployment rests with each of the participating member states, the planning for force deployment requires early co-ordination and harmonization, which fall under the auspices of the Operation Commander (EU Concept for Force Deployment, 2008).

This section defines the effort of bring out the FHQSA and the difficulties faced by the environment itself, the nature of the operation and the need to provide credits away from Greece for a long time

B. LOGISTIC CONCEPT FOR THE SUPPORT AREA IN DJIBOUTI




Figure 10. Problems of the Preparatory phase

1. Preparation for the Activation and Deployment

On August 5, 2008, the European Council approved a crisis management concept, to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. On November 12, 2008 the European Union conducted the first naval operation called ATALANTA for peace and international security in the Gulf of Aden region (EUCOUNCIL, Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on European Union military Operation, 2008).

The HQ was “Stood Up” on December 8, 2008 and the force commander deployed on December 16, 2008. The EU's mission covered an area of up to 500nm off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The common costs of the operation for 2008 were EUR 8.3 million. These ‘common costs’ were paid through contributions by member states to the “ATHENA” financial mechanism based on GDP.

In support of ATALANTA planning, a team from EU OHQ Northwood conducted liaison and reconnaissance in Djibouti, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, from

November 16 to 25, 2008. The goal of this team was to provide a record of the general program and findings of the liaison and reconnaissance conducted in Djibouti and the other places, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. Initially EU covers the costs of transport and accommodation necessary for exploratory missions and preparations and also medical expenses, for the military persons taking part in this exploratory mission and preparation.

So the first part of the preparation of Operation ATALANTA was during the period from November 12, 2008 until the arrival of the Operation Commander on December 16, 2008. This preparation team of British and French military members succeeded in collecting information and data about possible contractors (local reliable bank, local association of business and industry, chamber of commerce), finding a possible location for the logistic support hub in the French air base and collecting all the necessary information about the possible local support (EU member state, Commission delegation, United Nations, local authorities)

The logistics concept for the delivery of support to deployed forces in the area of operation was based on a multinational strategic hub at Djibouti and forward support locations at Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. Movement and transportation of personnel and equipment between Djibouti and the forward support location(s) was expected to be by air. At the beginning it was planned that this requirement would be satisfied by commercial air transport. However, if volumes or the sensitive nature of the cargo dictated, then intra-theatre military air transport would cover the requirement. But, given the absence of direct commercial flights from Djibouti to either of the likely forward support locations such as Mombasa, this solution lead to distribution delays because the logistic support station in Djibouti (FHQSA) was far away when the units were outside the Gulf of Aden.

The other ports around the Gulf of Aden provide a few notable infrastructures and also there were waiting list for berthing. So the only primary method of resupply of provisions was the use of a primary coordinating shipping agent. For this reason the ships liaised directly with the agent for supplies and other supporting services. However, when

strategic resupply and operational defect stores demands were arranged on a national basis and coordinated in theatre by the multinational FHQSA in Djibouti or by a surge capability in Mombasa.

Djibouti has identified as the base for the FHQSA and the theatre hub for logistics. Its role included providing the reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOM&I) of personnel, equipment and supplies from troop contributing nations (TCN) and their onward distribution to force units within theatre. The preferred FHQSA location was within the French base due to the availability of force protection and security (OPLAN, 2009).

The truth is that a specialized staff implemented the logistic functions at the EU OHQ level. This staff had to coordinate the actions within the overall logistic organization, other staff branches and all the implemented countries of EU and any other possible logistic actors (OPLAN, 2009).

Their contribution was very helpful due to the fact that they were familiar with the EU regulations and very experienced in contingency operations. This team was monitor and developed the logistic plans, provided continuous assessments, advice and guidance for logistic support. Furthermore, OHQ J4 carried out the logistic control over the ongoing operation, to dealing with the fields of strategic movement and transport, contribution to logistic support, infrastructure engineering, multinational support co-ordination, and HNS.

Their actions was took into account the need of co-ordination and co-operation in order to reach better efficiency and best use of scarce logistic resources and facilities. This can be reached through proceedings such as lead nation, role specialized nation, or framework nation as well as through mutual support agreements. Definition and general design of these forms of cooperation are EU OHQ responsibility CJ4 is also responsible for the planning and co-ordination of movement and transportation, maintenance and sustainment of the operation (OPLAN, 2009).




Figure 11. Satellite view of Djibouti City. A country, a city, a port (After: Google, 2010)

During the preparatory phase of the operation, it was essential to produce a logistics estimate to provide a sound basis for the operation. All the information must be evaluated prior to a decision being made to initiate an initial plan or pursue conduct of an operation. The estimation is developed in order to reduce preparation time and to provide a flexible framework for data and important factors (OPLAN, 2009).

2. Accommodation for FHQSA Personnel

The author arrived in Djibouti on December 13, 2008, three days before the arrival of FHQ COM and was briefed extensively by the persons who were there one month earlier to investigate the area. Accommodation had been organized in a local hotel. It was not clear what the accommodation costs were and how the hotel would be paid for

these costs, so we used our personal credit cards as a guarantee. The French military had no spare capacity for FHQSA personnel to live in military accommodations, and no other hotel met the force protection or health and hygiene requirements to safely keep personnel ashore.



Figure 12. Hotel in Djibouti City

An accommodation contract had not been signed until the end of February 2009. The sales and marketing manager of the hotel in which we were accommodated was awaiting dialogue with our headquarters J8 to discuss the contract and the reduction in the accommodation rate to a group rate for at least two months. For this contract, all the negotiations needed to take place with our J8 commander because the total amount of the contract was only under his authority. This contract was difficult because the EU paid the accommodation but food and all the other expenses were the responsibility of each member country. We also had some problematic issues of how the hotel bills would be settled, particularly for those personnel who were based in Djibouti for a month or more. Finally, the contract finished on March 2009, with a delay of three months. During these three months, three different contracting officers negotiated and at the end we had a contract that caused many of the same minor problems as at the beginning. As the time

passed these problems became a daily argument among the personnel. The main reason was that the hotel was the only place where we could pass our free time, and thus spend money. However, the contract we had at the end covered only the accommodation expenses and merely offered discounts for all the other expenses (e.g., food, drink, laundry). For some team members, their home country paid these directly, but others were forced to cover the expenses themselves and reclaim them later.

3. Organize the Chain Of Command

The first five main tasks, according to the preparation phase of the ATHENA mechanism, the plan of the operation and the orders we had, were first of all to collect information and data about possible contractors (local reliable bank, local association of business and industry, chamber of commerce) and find a location for the logistic support hub. After to organize the Chain Of Command and establish connection with the senior J8 section. Then, to organize the work flow and set up the sub-delegations of powers (in writing) and the reporting routine and finally set up the flow of funds. The third step was to open a bank account dedicated to ATHENA funds, preferably in Euros in a bank with its head office in the EU. After this we would be ready to request approval and transfer satisfy funds with security to the area of operation. We should prepare for the Next Phase and estimate the Preference Amount of Money by answering the following questions:

- What would be the major needs for the operation?
- How those needs be met (national offer or procurement)?
- If procurement were necessary, how would it be done? What was the cost?
- Which costs should be financed from the common account ATHENA?
Which costs should be nation borne costs?
- Prepare the procurement procedures.

Although the questions looks so easy to have an answer in reality were tragic as we have not been familiar with EU mechanism of flow of funds and the procurement procedures. Following these, some major concerns had been raised and needed urgent resolution in order to deliver an effective FHQSA in Djibouti, especially as we needed to complete most of our tasks as urgent.

The last task during the preparatory phase was to report at the senior J8 section the budgetary and legal commitments, the payments, the Cash flow table, the commentary to justify spending and start immediately inventories and accounting.

All the above-mentioned tasks had to do only with financial and logistic preparation of the forward hub. On the other hand are all the important operational tasks that should be finished at the same time, such as personnel accommodation and RLS, office building and facilities, operational capabilities of the DHQSA in Djibouti and also some general unexpected issues like the tax exception, the public and diplomatic relationships. Also the legal framework of the operation was totally unknown; in combination with the absence of legal support it was a challenge to structure your capabilities appropriately. The only way you had was to work hard and study much harder.

The good point was that close liaison was established with the French military at the French Airbase 188. It was very helpful and encouraging that we had several meetings with representatives from them, which were extremely helpful during the set up of the logistic hub, even though they were unable to give valuable support without approval from their government. We could not progress in several areas because the French authorities in Djibouti did not commit to anything without the 'Technical Agreement' from MOD in Paris. This was a critical issue and delayed the establishment of the FHQSA in the French air base. Until December 16, 2008, when the operational commander arrived in the area, there was no agreement between the French government and EU and we had no access to the French base.

4. Communication and Information System

Communication was another major issue because the secure data connections failed to work. We travelled to Djibouti with laptops that should have provided secure email; none worked for the first month at least. The only viable solution to transmit data was via the hotel's Internet connection, which was not secure! We communicated with cell phones purchased in Djibouti as the best solution for being in contact 24/7 or in case of emergency, but the information support was very bad.

The FHQSA was completely blind on determining ship locations in the EUNAVFOR in the AOO. Not knowing this vital information and when ships would be conducting port visits prevented the FHQSA from putting together a detailed plan for the transshipment of personnel-mail-cargo (PMC), both to and from EUNAVFOR ships. External communications continued to be a weakness that inhibited the ability of the FHQSA to conduct its business and maintain situational awareness. In relation to internal communications, at that time all emails to the FHQSA were received centrally. There were numerous delays in the receipt of emails by an action addressee due to system failures. In order to assist more efficient and targeted communications, there was a requirement for FHQSA staff to have individual email accounts.

At a minimum, each nation and ship should have a mailbox and participants should be familiar with broadband exploitation and protocols for handling crises on line through chat room and in cooperation with the other actors. After the first two months it was obvious that communication in EU naval operation was in infancy stage and began to revise the efforts and practices until having a satisfactory minimum level of limited information to all the involved bodies.

5. Multinational Personnel and Health Issues

Being deployed in a foreign country with different cultures and values causes complicated matters. The main issue was the climatic conditions (the combination of high temperature and high humidity) because approximately half of the manpower suffered from stomach sickness. Most of them were sick because of malaria pills and we had to ask for medical support from the French Military hospital but only after permission by the French authorities because it was not clear who covers the cost. The theater environment made it much more difficult to adapt and assimilate the battle rhythm.

It is obvious that personnel in EU NAVFOR come from varying cultures and legal systems and represent different levels of training and experience. So we spent a long time becoming familiar and growing to understand each other and the concept of the operation. Generally speaking, personnel must apply the provisions of Operation Plan (OPLAN), when applicable, the national law, and the laws of the contributing state. As a

rule, personnel should also respect local law unless the execution of the mission requires otherwise. The only thing I am sure is that nothing is like it first seems. In the beginning you feel like having to climb on Everest without equipment and previous training.

Personnel joining the FHQSA had not been provided with Terms of Reference/Job Description by the OHQ but we had to establish them. Although the personnel had been kept extremely busy in the setup of the FHQSA (and the construction of the future FHQSA) it had been extremely difficult employing so many people in support of just two ships. The requirement for rapid reaction followed by long periods of inactivity was a fact that demands on one hand to maintain staff morale at high level by never let them without tasks and on the other hand surprised them pleasantly with a sport event or an excursion to the country of Djibouti. The concern about the protection of the personnel was continuous and the challenge was to make them willing to overcome any shortages they had through the skills they have acquired from their previous services and hard work.

We spent many hours training nine of the personnel (who had no logistical background) in aspects of maritime forward support. The original recommendation was that a team of eight persons would have been more than sufficient to support a task group of this size. The other ships in the EUNAVFOR were being supported as follow: “FGS KARLSRHUE” by a German support team in Djibouti, “FS NIVOSE” and “FS PM LHER” supported by the French Naval Base, Spanish ship supported from the Spanish team (MPRA). The most curious fact was that although UK had the control of the operation, the British ship was part of a different naval operation with the same task (CTF 151). Still, the British team of the EU hub was taking logistic actions to support their ship. But it was amazing their organization to transfer the experience and lessons learned from operation to operation and the access they had to their DOD sites for support and information.

6. Host Nation Support and Statement of Forces Agreement Between EU and French Forces in Djibouti (FFDJ)

The logistic requirements to enable Djibouti's role as a hub include workplace accommodation, with communications access and storage space. The French infrastructure liaison officer within the French air base identified a temporary building as available for immediate occupancy. However, this was a short-term solution as the building was due to be demolished in the next two months. An area was also identified within the air base where temporary work accommodation could be installed. Given the short time to the commencement of operations and the impending demolition of the temporary building, early action was required between the EU and France.

Another one element that is vital for all kinds of operation is the Host Nation Support (HNS)⁹. In operation ATALANTA the Statement of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Technical Agreement (TA) between the French Forces and the Djiboutian authorities respectively, were the main conflicts and problems. After the first four months of the activation in the area the Technical agreement hasn't been signed and the SOFA was under dispute of the Djiboutian authorities.

⁹ According to EU Council 11716/1/08 definition "HNS is the civil and military assistance provided by an HN to the forces located in or transiting through that HN's territory. HNS plays a critical role in almost all operations. Efficient use of available HNS can greatly aid a tailored force package and augment the deployed sustainment force structure. Usually HNS are facilities like transportation, services and civilian supplies, labor, construction equipment and materials, The main factors that influence the use of HNS in an operation are: capability, dependability, and willingness of HN to provide assistance." (EUCOUNCIL, EU CONCEPT 11716/08 FOR CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC), 2008)




Figure 13. French Air Base 188 in Djibouti, the old and new FHQSA, international airport of Djibouti, U.S. Camp Lemonier. (After: Google, 2010)

HNS agreement was complex and required deliberate and continuous coordination among the implementing countries. HNS could reduce the lead-time support to the EU forces and also it could benefits the local area economy. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and/or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Djiboutian authorities should have been established earlier, enabling the FHQ staff to visit Djibouti without getting visas. Also, the Technical Arrangement was signed and sent to Paris for signature during this period but still there wasn't any official agreement or signed document.

Nevertheless, SOFA has a great impact on HNS why it should be taken into account in the development of HNS agreements. A SOFA not only describes the status of the EU-led forces but also influences the actualization of their mission with the HN. It specifies the obligations, privileges, immunities and facilities of the forces when present

on the territory of the HN. Without the SOFA agreement is impossible to any military forces deployed in a different country (EUCOUNCIL, EU CONCEPT 11716/08 FOR CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC), 2008).

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Djiboutian authorities should have been established earlier, enabling the FHQ staff and the other personnel participating in operation ATALANTA to visit Djibouti without getting visas. Also, the Technical Arrangement was signed and sent to Paris for signature during Feb 2009. However, the French advised that, due to staffing complexity in the French MoD, it would be simpler to proceed with a different type of document called a “Command Document de Procedure.” The timeline and process for completion was awaiting advice from Paris.

Goods and services purchased in the EU and in theatre or imported to theatre for an EU operation having military or defense implications should in principle be exempt from taxes, customs duties and onerous customs procedures. Only taxes that are merely charges for public utilities or services rendered have to be paid.

EU usually obtains from the host nation a full exemption from taxes, the VAT, customs duties and customs procedures and accepts to pay only those taxes that are the price of services rendered. These exemptions are obtained first through an exchange of letters between the host nation's authorities and the Council General Secretary, at a later stage through the SOFA. The exact scope of exemptions has to be checked in those texts. That was the main conflict between Djiboutian Ministry of Finance and EU Forces in Djibouti since 2009 the year that Djibouti established for first time in his history the value added tax (VAT). According to SOFA EUNAVFOR should not pay taxes in Djibouti but SOFA have signed before the Djiboutian government establishes the VAT.

All these negotiations with local customs, fiscal authorities and port or airport authorities was extremely difficult and out of power of FHQSA since it was necessary to involve the Force Commander or the Operation Commander in order to have the host nation's highest authorities issue and the necessary instructions to their subordinate authorities.

Things were moving on the ground but without the technical agreement, which also covered our medical needs. We really needed some urgent action on the issues raised above if we had to get things up.

7. Contracts

Being deployed in a foreign country with different cultures and values causes complicated matters. Required pricing proposals were too complicated for many of the local vendors. Full and open competition mandated by the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), which is a U.S. statutory provision and is shared in principle with the EU, was almost impossible due to the increased urgency of need and the limited sources of supply. Determination of contractor responsibility and fair and reasonable prices was entrusted to the contracting officer's judgment, and was complicated by the lack of market knowledge.

There was a requirement for primary coordinating agency services for EU Naval Force FE. These services would include the provision of provisions, port services, airport services, personnel and freight transportation, and customs clearance. Suitable agencies to cover all possible FHQ forward support locations (Djibouti, Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, Salallah, Seychelles) were investigated.

Although ship logistic support was a national financial responsibility, the OHQ had to identify areas of possible common logistic support for the EU NAVFOR force elements and was seeking to arrange appropriate local contracts for ship support and fuels as early as possible. For this, a new contract officer worked to establish the enabling contracts for use of each country member without being an obligation. In the original Act, ship support and replenishment included fuel and the pre-financing sum calculated was based on this. We proposed to separate the fuel from the other services and treat it differently.

Real Life Support (RLS) was required for FHQSA permanent personnel and other personnel in transit, including FHQ units or FHQSA personnel. There was no military accommodation available within the French base and the alternative was to put a commercial arrangement in place using hotels or apartments.

The contracting requirements for materials and services for the RLS of FHQSA were also one of the main areas. The HNS role was not clear from the beginning. In the establishment of ATALNTA contracts, due to the lack of competitors, the most common procurement protocol was contract by negotiation. Often time this negotiation protocol was conducted without prior solicitation and/or publication of the ensuing contract. During the preparation phase of the operation ATALANTA the justification and approval (J&A) of non-competitive procurements was authorized due to limited availability of time, or urgent requirement basis. The first contract was signed after two months of the arrival of the Force Commander in the AOO. Contracting authorities or Authorizing Officers must be established by the head of the HQ budget-finance section (J8) (Financial rules-Part I-Article 1 & 2). In ATALANTA that happens after the first two months as none of the contracting officers stayed in the AOO more than one month.

In operation ATALANTA the procedures and the separation of the common and national cost¹⁰ were one of the main difficulties. At the January 2009 Special Committee, it was agreed to extend the list of nation-borne costs to cover personnel in the FHQSA. Pre-financing was required to allow ATHENA to pay invoices for food and laundry costs for personnel in Djibouti. The sums required should be separated per country. All these were based on actual facts for December and estimations for January and February. That was one of the reasons for confusion over the hotel contract negotiation, which took more than two months. Also we had to prepare for each month five different bills statements and asking from our contractors separated invoices per participating country. For

¹⁰ The operational common cost occurs when the EU Council decides to transport the forces to and from the theatre of a multinational task force. The “nation borne cost” covers expenses inextricably linked with the operation costs, but which are not eligible for common funding. NBCs differ from common costs in three respects:

- There is an ad hoc list of items for each operation
- No budget caps expenditure
- The financing by states is based on usage.

Suppliers are paid with funds provided by ATHENA, which are reimbursed by the EU member states contributing to the troops based on their usage of goods and services. The Special Committee may also decide that member states shall be requested to make a "deposit" to ATHENA to pre-finance NBCs during an operation or that ATHENA's budget will provide the necessary cash flow. (EUCOUNCIL, COUNCIL DECISION 2008/975/CFSP, 2008)

example we have to separate the accommodation cost to the invoices that would be paid from EU and after all the other invoices separated per country. So we had to find which had done the order or use the hotel service in other way it could not allocated.

The common costs of a military operation are listed as expenses of ATHENA¹¹ mechanism whenever they are incurred. When entered in an article of the budget showing the operation to which they are most related, they shall be regarded as operational costs of this operation. Otherwise, they shall be regarded as common costs incurred in preparation for, or following, operations (EU COUNCIL DECISION 2008/975/CFSP, 2008).

In cases where the common costs cannot be linked directly to a specific operation, the Special Committee may decide to allocate the corresponding appropriations to the general part of the annual budget. These appropriations should, as much as possible, be entered in articles showing the operation to which they are most related.

After further investigations, the notion of “administrative management of ship support services and replenishment” was found to include the following items: Pilotage, Tugs, Harbor dues, canal and landing fees, Customs, Hire charges, Repairs, Travel, transportation and freight, Water and food supplies, Waste and laundry, Accommodation, Communication, Medical services and Fuel and lubricants. That was something that caused a lot of discussion and misunderstanding between the country members until it was decided.

The good point was that the French military had a number of contracts in place that gave them a 35% discount on local rates. We had passed a list of requirements to the French base logistics officer who gave us prices on things like a printer/photocopier, etc.,

¹¹ ATHENA is a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of operations. ATHENA acts on behalf of the participating member or regarding contributing states and is the most important mechanism that supports financially all EU military operations. However ATHENA covers the common cost of an operation and not the nationally borne cost. The latter is the TCN responsibility. ATHENA is a non-profit organization that has the necessary legal capacity, in particular, to hold a bank account, acquire, hold or dispose property, enter into contracts and administrative arrangements and be a party to legal proceedings. ATHENA appropriations are used in accordance with the principles of sound financial management that is in accordance with the principles of economy, effectiveness and efficiency (EUCOUNCIL, COUNCIL DECISION 2008/975/CFSP, 2008).

with the discount they had obtained. This was considerably cheaper than using a contractor or agent alone. One of the requirements of using the contractors through the French military was that we needed the ability to pay for such items. In order to save money at the initial stages, it was imperative to have the capability to pay for things locally (local bank account). We needed this as soon as possible as we did not have the capability to pay anything.

Handling equipment was required to support the activity of the FHQSA. However, it was expected that drawing on existing French capacity could satisfy support. This needed to be formally agreed upon. The alternatives were to receive support from another nation or contract the hire of equipment.

Vehicles were required for the transportation of personnel and equipment within Djibouti. It was believed that this would be best achieved through the local hire or purchase of commercial vehicles. The vehicle contract and the vehicle fuels contract were very easy and finalized, but as far as the hotel contract was concerned it was not going well. For two months the FHQSA personnel and all the visitors were using the hotel without an agreement being in place, only a letter of intent. There were many reasons for this, first among them the need of the European Commission representative who visited FHQSA to verify that the acquisition procedures were according to EU rules. Finally, the hotel accommodation contract was signed at the end of February 2009 and the hotel received the first payment in the middle of March.

The fuel contract for vehicles and the fuel contract for ships needed to be separate contracts as EU covered the expenses of the logistic hub but not the cost of ship fuels, which was a national obligation. Only two commercial sources of fuel are available in Djibouti, but it took them three months to award to the same contractor with the French military. Fuel for vehicles initially was based on a coupon system, but was replaced with a chip card system from January 2009 onward. For maritime fuel requirements, the contractor was able to supply diesel but not F76. Although the U.S. Navy has F76 stocks at Djibouti, it was understood that these were a U.S. strategic reserve and were not available. For aircraft fuel if it was required other sources would need to be investigated. There were two options for the supply of diesel and JET A1 at Djibouti. The first was

through an agreement with the French. The second was through a commercial contract. When the force units contributing to the operation an estimate of fuel requirement could be calculated but during the negotiations it was unknown which and how many units would use this contract.

8. Flow of Funds

Delay of funds transfer and the implementation of the complex bureaucratic procedures caused delay in the preparation of the logistic hub. Surely, the most appropriate way to transfer money to the theatre of operation is through wired bank accounts; that was the procedure that was followed in the ATALANTA operation. Wire transfer worked perfect except during the first two months, in which there was a delay in the establishment of the imprest account, due to delay in authorization from EU Council to the Operational Commander.

The preparatory phase ends when the Council of EU, the J8 section and the chain of command approve the reference amount are organized and generally when flow of funds and accounting/reporting procedures are set. Then, representatives of all levels (EU commission, OHQ and FHQ) visit the theatre of operation at the appropriate time to ensure that the procedures are according to the regulations of the EU (EUCOUNCIL, COUNCIL DECISION 2008/975/CFSP, 2008).

This period was close to one month, starting from December 27, 2008 (which was the date of the official activation of FHQSA in Djibouti) and ending at the end of January when the first visit of the OHQ team and the operational admiral ended. But it is part of the preliminary phase, as most of the preparation work had not been finished, but also of the active phase since the operation had started and four ships were already in the theatre of operation.

The bank account finally was established and the first payments made at the end of Feb 2009. The FHQSA had a contract for agency and life support in Djibouti, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. All this period we were using services (tel. lines, internet,

hygiene services, accommodation, etc) and goods (vehicles, fuels, water, mobile phones) based on a letter of intent between the OHQ J8 and the contractor who was frustrated about the delay and ready to let us without fuels and communication.

9. The Project for the Permanent FHQSA

The FHQSA was established in two phases because the building that the French had allocated was due to be demolished. The proposed building office accommodation needed to be commissioned specifically for the EU and the FHQSA. The French had agreed to this building being located within the airbase and nominated a specific area for the build. The building required foundations and all utilities. The building was constructed from pre-fabricated container units. Only this was a huge task due the negotiations with the FFDJ and the local contractors because in Djibouti the services work with their own way.

The last contract was the agreement for groundwork and the purchase of bungalows for the permanent FHQSA base. After the beginning the difficulty was, firstly, to have an agreement with the French base about the place where we should put our bungalows, then who would do the groundwork and thirdly, who would provide us the bungalows. One of the main issues was if the contractors were trustworthy as far as the time and the specifications were concerned. The contract for the ground preparation was signed by the contracting officer of the air base, and we had to pay the French base when the groundwork was ready. As for the bungalows, the solution to bring them from Germany was much more expensive; second, the time of delivery was close to six months, and it was solely our responsibility to complete all necessary preparations in time.

On March the groundwork for the permanent building had started and the bungalows had been ordered. The temporary building had telephone lines with secure connection via satellite and of course Internet connection.

10. Media

A unique and unexpected, in terms of the size of the Operation, was the challenge and the need to manage the media requests and visits. The media was aiming to inform the public and was looking at every opportunity, in every place and in every way to achieve a photo or comment. But their access to the Deployed Units and personnel was under the delegation of the Force Commander. So when we had to inform the international media about the mission we had to ask for the agenda of the meeting in order to to prepare ourselves, and to ask the FHQ commander the right to conduct the meeting. But without previous experience and without direction or plans from EU OHQ, especially, before the establishment of the operation ATALANTA media centers, the situation was very sensitive and anxious. Once the EU media center in Northwood had been formally established, it took the media guidance. Once the media centers were established, all the deployed Forces and Units under its command had their media guidance from the OHQ with regard to policy and media facility procedures. But the key and positive point was the posting of material on the Internet (<http://www.eunavfor.eu/>, <http://www.mschoa.org/>) because media personnel had immediate access to EUNAVFOR activities.

C. CONCLUSION- RECOMMENDATIONS

During this month, the second of the operation, FHQSA numbered more than 35 persons due to the visit from OHQ for operational reasons. At least, concerning the permanent FHQSA personnel, things were clear as far as the number and the duties of each one. But this was not the case with the contracting officer, since in these two months the FHQSA had four different contracting officers and only one contract.

The FHQSA had all the answers to the main questions and solutions to needs according to the operational capabilities and the French air base support structures, although the agreement between the French government and the OHQ had not been signed.

Communications still was one of the biggest problems, as we did not have direct contact with the operational commander but only through OHQ.

But the main problem even at the last part of the deployment was that the operation's primary and active phase in reality occurred over the same period of time. The operation was launched at extremely short notice, with the UK making the offer to establish and run the operation on October 10, the OHQ established within 2 weeks thereafter and a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) approved before joint action on November 10. The Operational Plan (OPLAN) was completed and approved and force generation occurred before the end of November. Operational IOC occurred 2 weeks later. Real-life support arrangements would be provided by the team based ashore in Djibouti (FHQ (Support Area)) responsible for liaising with Maritime Patrol Aircraft in Djibouti and arranging logistic support to the ATALANTA task force.

The J8 and J4 should have established SOPs to ensure that HQ personnel were aware of the rules and procedures regarding travelling. These SOPs should notably specify procedures for obtaining travel tickets and reservations indicate that the economy class is mandatory when travelling by air with possibly exceptions, and lay out rules on rotations and leaves paid for in common. Also, it should establish a small "travel office" in its section for booking tickets. This should both provide practical support to HQs and ensure that rules are complied with.

In short, those were the main issues we had to solve during the first months of deployment. Eventually, it worked well over there in Djibouti transforming a dilapidated old hangar into the Forward Headquarters Support Area; this was a major task in itself, but also changed the focus from set-up to support. More needed to be done to find out where the ships were, to have the ability to talk to them securely and to investigate how we could get the supply chains working for them.

THE FHQSA was established to provide support to the FHQ afloat for their mission. Operational contingencies dictated the FHQSA should be established quickly and as the operation progressed that continual review and, if appropriate, modification, of the FHQSA was necessary until it achieved a robust and sustainable steady state.

The FHQSA is an unfamiliar concept that is outside the existing NATO norms of forward maritime logistical support. In its current form, it is staffed beyond the typical

FLS and may have more in common with the NATO concept of an ALSS but without the hub role. The FHQSA is located within French Airbase 188, and with close proximity of the well-established German Naval Detachment, the Spanish MPRA and the French maritime base. The U.S. also has a nearby presence but is not participating in this operation.



Figure 14. This handout photo shows Somali pirates hijacking the MV Faina, a cargo ship owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine on September 25, 2008. The pirates ultimately released the MV Faina and its cargo of 33 Soviet-era T-72 tanks plus other weapons on February 5, 2009 following a ransom payment of \$3.2 million, a local man who helped negotiate the deal said. (From: REUTERS/U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, 2009)

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V. LESSONS LEARNED

A. LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE HELLENIC NAVY

It is important for Greece to establish and include a contingency contracting support plan (CCSP) within all levels of the planning process; this will improve the support that all involved receive during a contingency operation. The Navy Supplies and Services Contingency Contracting Program were chartered to provide logistics support to the fleet and multinational forces in support of contingency operations.

The contingency management techniques under a European Union operation, in a foreign environment, demand personnel, material, money, transport, medicine, public health, and communication support. The increasing complexity, uncertainty, urgency, and magnitude of global emergency relief operations create a critical need for effective and efficient contingency management. The military forces shall be prepared to respond to an emergency according to their parts in the division of duties and the relevant contingency plans. The requirements of contingency rescue operations and the essential needs of people in disaster areas should be met and recovered.

1. Hellenic Navy Should Establish a Secure Website for Lessons Learned

Taking part in multinational operations far from home country is always a challenge for the Hellenic Navy. Personnel are not trained on international regulations and procedures, especially in this operation, as it was the first under the EU umbrella. But despite the successful participation, the Hellenic Navy must establish the procedures for collecting and analyzing feedback. Surely there would be difficulties and problems. It is necessary to have the feedback procedure to avoid them in the future. Until now the Hellenic Navy uses feedback only in cases of accidents in order to compensate affected parties. Hellenic Navy should get rid of the wrong mentality “no work, no risk. No risk, no mistakes.”

It is mandatory for the military to use technology in its efforts in order to improve. The HN should establish a website and include tools that will focus on performing duties in all types of contracting and contingency contracting. The website should include

information regarding the failures of a contract, users' comments and suggestions, copies of the forms and the EU and NATO procedures. A web site like the UK MOD defense acquisition community site, where the user has the ability to upload or download data will speed up the procurement process and possibly alleviate mistakes. The participation in ATALANTA was an acquisition of experience for Greece at all levels (political, strategic, military, logistic support) but without transforming this experience and lessons learned there is no progress.

2. Update the Acquisition Procedures to Include Contingency Operations.

The Hellenic Navy has participated in nearly all NATO operations for more than twenty years, but still has not introduced the term "contingency" in the preparation phase. The traditional acquisition and contracting methods are based in laws and procedures of the 1970s and the dogma that the military way is always the best. Government acquisition laws and Hellenic Navy directions are designed to deliver the best value product with respect to the taxpayers' money and fulfilling the public trust. These regulations are based in a peacetime environment where time and urgency of the need are not significant factors. However, contingency missions and urgent needs require flexibility and adaptive business practices to allow contracting officers to operate more effectively. The procedure of requesting approval from higher authorities is accepted if it is not time consuming and does not require more paperwork than usual. The procedures of acquisition must be decentralized for small amounts of money and must be different for the minor purchases that sometimes are necessary. The euro thresholds should be higher in case of a contingency phase.

3. Training the Contracting Officers in EU and NATO Contracting Procedures

The Hellenic Navy has not separated the supply officers and financial officers based on their training and experience in contracting. It is required for an officer to be aware for both procedures during his career. Of course it is vital to be aware of the

procedures but this is different from being trained to do both. The financial procedures should be separated from contracting and both of them from the logistic service, primarily for accountability purposes.

The absence of sufficient training in EU or NATO contracting and contingency contracting methods is also a problem. The Hellenic Navy acquisition procedures are stuck in the past. Hellenic officers that have been training in Europe or the U.S. have never been asked to integrate the lessons learned and their experience in the strategic and operational levels.

4. Lack of Experienced Personnel in the New Acquisition Methods in the Planning Department

There is also a lack of experienced personnel in the upper level of the contract and planning department. Also, it would be good if training of contracting officers could be expanded to cover contingency contracting procedures and the international manuals of contracts.

In addition, the regulations and orders for the acquisition procedures are rooted in the assumption that all persons are thieves until proven otherwise. This over-complication of safeguards and checks naturally causes a lot of delays and bureaucracy in contracting procedures. The solution is not complication, but rather an acquisition system based in electronic databases and procedures with embedded safeguards. A system is needed that would not allow the sellers to meet buyers and vice versa until the final step of the delivery of goods and services.

5. Establish a Data Base with the Contractors and the Prices of the Goods and Services

Even in the ATALANTA operation in Africa, where the EU regulations and acquisition procedures were difficult to apply due to lack of resources or technology, the control was perfect because there was a data base of the material and services prices on the local market.

At this moment, the Hellenic Navy has seven frigates that operate abroad and they do not have the opportunity to visit a website and review the previous contracts, names of contractors and prices achieved, or the lessons learned or difficulties that could be avoided with the contractors and the prices at ports at least around the Mediterranean Sea.

B. LESSONS LEARNED FOR EU

It has been mentioned above that ATALANTA was the first European Union naval operation. This was the first European contingency operation but unfortunately it was not the first crisis management operation for the EU. Although the EU is a recent creation, it has already taken part in more than twenty military operations known as Petersburg tasks, as we can see in Figure 15. Of course, each operation is different and these differences are the distance between failure and success.



Figure 15. European Union Missions and Operation (From: EUNAVFOR, 2010)

Europe, and whole the world, is entering a new era of rapid communications technologies that change the way we live, work, play, and fight. We need new way of thinking, new criticisms, alternative approaches, and new understandings. Creativity is more important than ever. We have become an information society, which is an environment in which more jobs create, process, or distribute information than directly produce goods, and this change has impacted the military as well.

1. Contracting Officers Must Arrive in the AOO with the Reconnaissance Team

It is well known that the first 30–40 days of an operation, the initial deployment, is characterized by an extremely high battle-rhythm, confusion and stress due to the myriad requirements and the lack of funds and information. However, during the first 40 days of ATALANTA there was no contracting officer in the area of the deployment. It would be preferable for the contracting officer to be in the area first with the reconnaissance team and start the procedures to cover the life support requirements. This is vital, especially in case of deployment in an unfriendly environment where the personnel feel unwelcome and without support.

2. All the Expenditures in the AOO Must Be Covered by the ATHENA Mechanism

The ATHENA mechanism uses two main categories of cost: the national borne cost and the common cost. The EU member states contribute to ATHENA so the funds are coming from members; however, during a military operation the ATHENA mechanism does not cover all the cost but asks the member states to pay their own expenses. It would be more convenient and helpful if all the expenditures in the area of operation were covered from the same budget and only later separated among the TCN. For example, the EU says that it covers the cost of FHQ but the cost of the ship is national. How could you separate the fuels and allocate all the other costs during the operation? The worst was that each country contributed in a different way and in different areas. It was obvious, for example, that all the contracting officers were in Northwood as the money and the facilities there were better than in Djibouti and no one of them wanted

to leave. However, if it were known from the beginning that the salaries were the same in both locations, and paid from the ATHENA mechanism, we would avoid all these delays and conflicts with the contracts.

3. Advanced Logistic Preparation and Coordination between the Members Countries

What has been learned also is that national efforts that address the causes of relief operations are not so complex task as the multinational and multilateral efforts that emphasize cooperation and communication, using air and sea patrols, contributing by providing increased security. Communication and cooperation in this kind of operation are keys to success. Each nation has its language, rules and ethics that should be respected and controlled. It is not possible, for example, for each nation in the same operation to demand that all others speak that nation's language. It is known that there is always a conflict between the French and English about their language, but a compromise must be reach. Taking part in a meeting in which each participant speaks his/her native language is like taking part in a comedy.

4. Early Preparation for Contract Support and Flow of Funds

Early preparation is essential for success in contingency operations. Websites with country studies, updated situation reports, EU regulations and delegations and other information would help to prepare for contracting before deployment. Advance preparation is also necessary in order to provide effective contractual support throughout the entire contingency operation. One of the main problems of ATALANTA was the delay in transfer of funds in the AOO. This was caused by the delay in approval of funds from the EU council and secondly that the operation began before the end of the preparatory phase.

5. Technical Problems of Communication Should Be Solved in the First Phase of an Operation

The success of military operations in the future will depend greatly upon the availability of a communication system of adequate mobility, traffic capacity, and reliability. One of the factors that prohibit the logistic support success of a contingency

operation is the lack of communication between the units and the member states. While the EU is a unique union of sovereign nations, with a unique mission and capability, it is important to remember that it is still ultimately an organization. As such, it is susceptible to the same structural problems that any other organization is susceptible, especially when it comes to organizational communication. Because the EU is a unique organization, it has specific communication needs.

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V. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY

The purpose of this project was to investigate the rules and procedures of the European Union pertaining to the deployment and contribution of its members in military operations and, more specifically, in the support of the first EU naval antipiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, it provide an analysis of the first four months of deployment and identified the lessons learned that could be applied in the EU operations and Hellenic Navy contingency operations.

Contingency operations continue to introduce new lessons in the fields of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities. Future operations are likely to take place in conjunction with joint and multinational forces, and require cooperation from other agencies as well as other governments. Conditions in the Gulf of Aden fully fit this description. But because of a lack of robust pre-deployment training, the staff found it difficult to comprehend the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational complexity of the operational environment until assuming its responsibilities and becoming fully operational. This complexity was particularly evident in the formulation of the operation, and the planning of logistic support in coordination with other lines of operation. At this time, there was no apparent interagency structure for working with other interagency participants. Therefore, personnel expressed frustration with the existing (ad hoc and inconsistent) methods of coordination. Although personnel made concerted efforts to coordinate, the results were not visible. Everybody agreed there was a definite lack of control at the logistical level between the Operational Force Commander and other players. This led to duplication of efforts.

B. CONCLUSION

The march of events in recent years, particularly in the two years of the crisis, (2009-2010) demonstrated that the EU fell completely out of the central role assigned to itself on the world. The reasons are many. First, the whole scheme had underestimated

the fact that while the hegemonic role of the U.S. actually declined, the country remains by far the strongest power in the modern world. Without U.S. contribution of fuel at sea this operation would have a main unsolved issue, until Italy decides to contribute with a re-fueling ship, four months into the operation.

Essentially, the policy of integration is not progressing and if they continue to grow without deepening the integration process, this will shortly lead to a complete relaxation and undermining prospects for a unified and coherent center. As Theo Tinteman had said: “home does not end in construction, will be transformed into ruins soon”. The more complete the dream of integration, the more able to make practical steps. EU actions are limited on accumulation of stricter discipline, and punishment of those who do not implement the writings of the conservatives with precision. Unable to establish a military operation without NATO contribution and to overtake the conflict of interest between the strongest member states, like Germany, England and France (Kotzias, 2010).

Europe is in crisis on its future because they recover the state and economic nationalism, especially in Germany, and also because in the crisis they have undermined the plan of consolidation relations between the elites, and the reality faced by large populations. In this context, the EU shows not only unable to solve the relationship between demographic problems and the regulation of immigration, but also to shape common foreign and security policy.

In these circumstances, it is clear that strong countries of EU will look for new solutions. Even with dramatic twists in the process of European integration. In this case, however, Greece has to create strong alliances, both to resist extreme thoughts on these upheavals, and to promote an idea of its own vision for the future of EU.

The problem is that Greece shows unprepared in front of the changing world. The government shows without a steady cruise line in its foreign and security policy. Unlike our major partners in the EU, there does not seem to have adequate perception of the changes made. That is not active policy, but merely reacting spasmodically on movements and third choices to adapt to partners. The passive policy that was followed

has led to declining international position of the country. Greece does not have a coherent plan for an international position. Neither opinion about what should be the role of the EU in world politics. Nor, towards what direction EU should move.

Since Greece accession to the EU, the country lacks a specific policy on the EU's prospects and future. It has developed a Greek European Politics and simply follows the suggestions and comments of others.

Greece cannot continue to be treated in the EU without a compass. The reason is that national interests do not often coincide with the interests of other member states. On the other hand, it cannot be a general belief in EU that the only foreign policy issue that the country has is the differences with their immediate neighbors and neglect to contribute to a Greek European policy and on the promotion and implementation of a policy. The country needs knowledge, creative thoughts, original proposals and solutions, output from the misery of the current political scene. These problems existed already before joining the EU. What lack are the right choices and decisions and support of the Greek interests in the EU (Kotzias, 2010).

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